spotlight europe #2012/06 - September 2012: The value of Europe by Fritz-Vannahme, Joachim
spotlight europe
# 2012 / 06 — September 2012
The Value of Europe
s
p
o
t
l
i
g
h
t
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
 
#
 
2
0
1
2
 
/
 
0
6
Do the citizens of the EU actually know what it is worth to them personally? 
    . t p m e t n o c   h t i w   t i   d r a g e r   d n a   t i   t c e j e r   y e h t   t a h t   t s e g g u s   y l g n i s a e r c n i   s y e v r u s   e h T
After living for years in a state of emergency, many people have started to cast 
doubt on the whole notion of integration, and on the ability of the politicians 
involved to find meaningful solutions to the crisis. 
There is a growing desire to retreat to what is 
considered to be a safe haven, the nation-state. 
Many EU citizens in Germany and elsewhere 
believe that they would be better off without 
the euro and without the EU. There is a lack of 
trust, and not much confidence. Despite their 
apparent diversity, the member states are none-
theless all rather similar when it comes to the 
subject of pessimism. 
So what can be done about it? German foreign 
minister Guido Westerwelle has put it rather 
succinctly. “We need to rediscover what the 
value of Europe is. Europe needs a new raison 
d’être. If Europe manages to persuade its citi-
zens that it is a good thing, it will be possible to 
deal with the crisis.” 
That is what needs to be done. But does it in fact 
point to the solution?
Personal situation without EU
Source: TNS Emnid GmbH / Bertelsmann Stiftung © Bertelsmann Stiftung
If the European Union did not exist, would your personal situation be . . .?
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much worse
don’t know, no response
Basis:  Germany: 1.001,     France: 1.004,     Poland: 1.000 interviewees
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However, their cohesive impact is not powerful 
enough in the current crisis to strengthen the 
feeling that we are all part of the same politi-
cal entity. Let us look first of all at the value of 
freedom. “Freedom makes our diversity possi-
ble,” Chancellor Angela Merkel said in a speech 
to the European Parliament in 2007. Such free-
dom did not exist “without reference to any-
thing else,” since it went hand in hand with a 
feeling of responsibility for other people. “So 
when we speak of true freedom, we are always 
speaking of the freedom of other people.”  (4)
Thus in a diverse community the notion of free-
dom implies doing something for others, and 
this is usually circumscribed with the word 
solidarity. 
Of course, many people currently find the idea 
of solidarity rather difficult to understand. 
They either pour scorn on the southern EU 
member states, which are suspected of indulg-
ing in dolce far niente, or insinuate that German 
policymakers are motivated by a craving for 
hegemony. Prominent politicians occasionally 
regale the electorate with scoffing and jeering, 
since this is obviously a good vote-catching 
technique. This is not only a crude and offen-
sive way of interacting with one’s partners. It 
also betrays a complete misunderstanding of 
the reasons for the crisis, which is due not only 
to individual malfeasance or national wrongdo-
ing, but to serious errors in the international 
banking and financial services sector, and to 
design faults in the European economic and 
monetary union. Only the second part of the 
project actually materialized, whereas the first, 
the economic union, was culpably neglected. 
Yet calls for solidarity within the EU provide 
the moral and political levers that are needed 
in order to resolve the crisis. 
The political scientists Kalypso Nicolaïdes and 
Juri Viehoff, who teach at the University of 
Oxford, have put it thus: “Solidarity can play 
a similar role in underpinning European inte-
gration in the future as ‘peace’ played in the 
foundation years.” 
Solidarity with the weak must first of all be 
demonstrated by the strong. So here Germany 
obviously has an obligation to fulfil. In order 
Why does the European Union actually exist? 
A growing number of people find it impossible 
to answer this question. Why, on a daily basis, 
do 27 member states and half a billion people 
look for ways of saying what they think and 
getting on peacefully with each other? What 
in its innermost being actually holds the Un-
ion together? Is it a joint budget of just about 
one percent of the joint gross domestic product? 
Joint legislative and judicial systems which do 
not vary from place to place? A handful of joint 
institutions, which are usually referred to with 
the word “Brussels”? A single market with its 
own specific rules and regulations and its four 
freedoms, the free movement of people, goods, 
services and capital?
Advantages and disadvantages 
of EU membership
Is (country being sampled) membership of the EU . . . for you personally?
Source: TNS Emnid GmbH / Bertelsmann Stiftung © Bertelsmann Stiftung
more of an advantage    
more of a disadvantage    
don’t know, no response
%
52
54
65
32
32
17
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18
Basis:  Germany: 1.001,     France: 1.004,     Poland: 1.000 interviewees
An answer to the question of inner cohesion is 
provided by the second article of the Treaty of 
Lisbon: “The Union is founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belong-
ing to minorities. These values are common to 
the Member States in a society in which plural-
ism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, soli-
darity and equality between women and men 
prevail.” (Article 2, TEU)
These are high-sounding words indeed, though 
their meaning may not be exactly the same 
in the various nations and political traditions. 3
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to ensure that such solidarity does not become 
an unbearable burden, it must go hand in hand 
with sound financial management, both in the 
member states, and in the European institu-
tions and policy areas. This does not exist. And 
when all is said and done only sound economic 
management and solidarity among partners 
can underpin Europe’s political self-assertion, 
which is something that many citizens would 
like to see, in the context of global systemic 
competition. Here again surveys show that 
many people continue to believe in Europe, but 
think that they have been deceived, or are sim-
ply disappointed.
Economic dependence on the EU
Will (country being sampled) need the EU in future in order to keep up with 
great powers such as China, the US, Russia or India in economic terms, or 
can (country being sampled) keep up with these states in economic terms 
without being a member of the EU?
Source: TNS Emnid GmbH / Bertelsmann Stiftung © Bertelsmann Stiftung
country needs the EU
country does not need the EU
don’t know, no response
%
57
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57
39
30
29
4
8
14
Basis:  Germany: 1.001,     France: 1.004,     Poland: 1.000 interviewees
A meaningful course of action is made more 
difficult by a myopic economic attitude which 
has crept into what people think and say, and 
not only in Germany. This short-sighted view 
leads people to believe, erroneously, as it 
happens, that the Union was founded for the   
enrichment of its members. That was also part 
of the plan, but not the whole plan. Similarly, 
the widespread talk of “European Added Value,” 
which is especially rife in Brussels, is based 
on this popular misconception. Europe’s value 
cannot be calculated (only) on the basis of a 
cost-benefit analysis.
Source: TNS Emnid GmbH / Bertelsmann Stiftung © Bertelsmann Stiftung
How good is the EU at striking the right balance between the market 
economy and social responsibility?
Market economy versus social responsibility
%
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very good
rather good
rather bad
very bad
don’t know, no response
Basis:  Germany: 1.001,     France: 1.004,     Poland: 1.000 interviewees
“Europe” has always been and continues to be 
a political project. The EU is a union based on 
values and not a joint-stock company. It is true, 
of course, that in the course of more than fifty 
years European integration has changed its rai-
son d’être, its self-image, and its narrated histo-
ry. In the pioneering days its motto was “Peace 
and Freedom,” for the Second World War was 
still very much in people’s minds. The advent of 
the Iron Curtain was a shock, and as time went 
on this was added to the historical narrative, 
which now consisted of three elements, peace, 
freedom, and prosperity. When all is said and 
done, this was still a political slogan.
After 1989, and in particular after the grand en-
largement of the Union in 2004, people in the 
old member states started to talk about the EU 
in terms of a cost-benefit analysis and nothing 
else. What are we getting or what am I getting 
out of the Union? Am I going to be threatened 
by the Polish plumber or the Hungarian con-
struction worker? This unfortunate concen-
tration on the economic side of the equation   
depoliticizes and emasculates the European 
idea, and encourages the spread of neo-na-
tionalism. That was not the reason why peo-
ple pushed ahead with integration in the past. 
Furthermore, it is quite obviously becoming a   
victim of habit, or, if one wants to put it that 
way, of its own success. Peace and freedom are 
taken for granted, whereas many people see 
their prosperity threatened. One only has to s
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Social peace through EU membership
Source: TNS Emnid GmbH / Bertelsmann Stiftung © Bertelsmann Stiftung
Has social peace in (country being sampled) become . . . as a result 
of EU membership?
more secure more insecure don’t know, no response
%
42
51
56
48
38
28
10
12
16
Basis:  Germany: 1.001,     France: 1.004,     Poland: 1.000 interviewees  
If, because there are no alternatives, democrati-
cally elected governments start to kow-tow to 
global markets and the global powers that be, 
the whole idea of a democratic election begins 
to seem rather hollow. Herfried Münkler, a Ber-
lin-based political scientist, has said: “Parlia-
ment simply gives its assent to what has been 
announced by the executive acting under pres-
sure exerted by the stock exchanges and rating 
agencies.” EU citizens consider this to be un-
just and unreasonable, no matter whether they 
live in Athens, Lisbon, Berlin or Paris. 
Münkler believes that parliamentary democ-
racy will soon disappear because the way in 
which it works has been damaged by “ongoing 
announcements about decisions to which there 
are no alternatives.” And the European Union 
and the euro, “which were actually supposed 
to be supranational bulwarks against markets 
which have taken on a life of their own, have 
had the opposite effect and are helping to mar-
ginalize national parliaments.” The European 
Union and the democracies that go to make it 
up need to find an answer to this. 
For this reason anyone who wants to talk about 
the value of Europe needs to talk about the 
state of European democracy. People no longer 
trust politicians in particular and policymak-
ing in general. Voter turnout levels are on the 
way down, whilst populist opinion leaders and 
parties are on the way up. So for that matter is 
euroscepticism. The crisis is everywhere. It is 
no longer merely a state of emergency brought 
about by debt repayment and banking prob-
think of China. This clearly weakens the tradi-
tional raison d’être of the European Union.
Of course, this weakness does not explain eve-
rything. Why, even after 60 years, are our com-
mon history and identity not strong enough in 
the current crisis to make the European Union 
look like a possible solution and not as part of 
the problem? The philosopher Jürgen Habermas 
believes that “the European Union will have to 
decide whether it wants transnational democ-
racy or post-democratic executive federalism.” 
Habermas’s sympathies are entirely on the side 
of the Union as it strives to turn itself into a 
transnational democracy. However, although 
the process has been initiated, it is still in its 
infancy. “If one does not wish to accept this, 
and is nonetheless forced to recognize that the 
growing dependence of nation-states on the 
systemic constraints of an increasingly inter-
dependent global society is irreversible, then it 
becomes apparent that there is a political need 
to expand democratic procedures beyond the 
borders of the nation-states.”  (8) 
Parliamentary democracy  
has its limits
If one looks at it in this context, national par-
liamentary democracy has literally come to the 
end of the road and quite clearly needs to be 
Europeanized. Thus democracy — in contrast to 
statements made by the German Constitutional 
Court — is not threatened by faults inherent in 
the European Union, but by a new-fangled kind 
of European “executive federalism” (Haber-
mas) that is not subject to parliamentary con-
trol. The threat resides in the fact that national 
executives have too much work on their hands 
and the legislatures do not have enough to do 
as a result of “the systemic constraints of an 
increasingly interdependent global society” 
(Habermas). To put it more precisely, democ-
racy in Europe is threatened by the pressure 
exerted by the stock exchanges, the rating 
agencies, and the world of banking and finan-
cial services, which, although they have been 
teetering on the brink of bankruptcy for years, 
tell policymakers what they should be doing 
and, if the worst comes to the worst, get the 
taxpayers to bail them out.5
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lems, or the impending bankruptcy of an EU 
member states, as in the case of Greece. What 
is at issue is the value of Europe, and the values 
that it represents. 
Born of necessity, not idealism
A lot has happened in the German debate on the 
subject. Remarks about a political union, and 
indeed about the United States of Europe, are 
now heard right across the whole range of the 
political spectrum. They are not the result of 
idealism, but a reflection of the fact that many 
politicians now understand that these policies 
are both inevitable and necessary. The debates 
being conducted in many other member states 
often admit (albeit rather grudgingly) that 
there is a compelling need for swift changes 
to the Treaty of Lisbon. Yet most of them recoil 
from the goal of a political union, or indeed the 
“United States of Europe.” This is true of both 
politicians and ordinary citizens. 
It is no accident that Chancellor Angela Mer-
kel’s proposals to hold a constitutional conven-
tion received a rather lukewarm welcome in 
Paris, Rome, and Warsaw. Currently it would 
in any case be impossible to obtain a majority 
for a political union, since neither governments 
nor the electorate are in favour of it. However, 
this should not stop us from conducting the 
inevitable debate on the future of Europe and 
on its value. In modern democracies majorities 
have to be fought for.
It may seem paradoxical, but currently the de-
bate about the future of the EU is very much 
alive in Germany (see the series of articles 
published this summer in the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung). The major parties are all 
in favour of a political union, though surveys 
show that most of the interviewees are (still) 
against it. 
Thinking about the value and meaning of   
Europe is thus not simply the stuff that well-
meaning speeches for formal occasions are 
made of, since it leads us to think about the state 
of our polity, which consists of 27 nation-states 
and the European institutions. It is increasingly   
unsatisfactory and rather frustrating.
The Council – neither fish nor fowl
In point of fact the Treaty of Lisbon has made 
this frustration even worse. In future there 
will be very few areas of government in which 
the EU is not permitted to operate, and soon 
the only exception is going to be security 
and defence policy. It is of course true that 
the role of the national parliaments has been   
upgraded by the Additional Protocol to the 
treaty. Moreover, the European Parliament 
has also acquired supervisory powers in 
many policy areas. All the same one had an 
uneasy feeling even before the outbreak of the 
great crisis. The changes applied primarily to 
the European Council, where the governments 
are represented. It now has a permanent presi-
dent. However, this council is neither fish nor 
fowl. It is a European assembly of national ex-
ecutives which performs a legislative function, 
and behind closed doors at that. A chamber of 
this kind would not be tolerated in any of the 
democratic systems of the member states.
The crisis has actually increased the predomi-
nance of the executive, and Habermas has 
criticized this rather tellingly by talking about 
executive federalism. However, as Münkler 
rightly points out, the predominant govern-
ments are also at the mercy of other kinds of 
pressure. The electorate is beginning to have 
the unpleasant feeling that it has no say what-
soever in what is going on, and no co-decision 
rights. Its representatives in the national par-
liaments seem to understand just as much 
about ESM, EFSF, the complex decisions of the 
ECB, and the even more complicated reforms 
in the European Council as man in the street.   
German citizens have turned for help to the 
Constitutional Court, an institution whose 
members are appointed (and not elected) on 
the basis of an extremely murky selection pro-
cedure, and who thus cannot be removed at the 
next elections. Since people no longer trust the 
EU, they have decided to place their faith in the 
supreme court. 
This way of looking at things is based on the 
idea that it is all Europe’s fault, for the big deci-
sions are taken on the European stage, or not 
taken, for that matter. Here the value of Europe 
is determined in a very specific way. s
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a political union, the like of which has never 
been seen. One does not have to worry about 
the impenetrable and technical fine print of a 
new treaty, but about a basic question: “Are the 
people in their capacity as sovereign prepared 
to transfer sovereignty to Europe in order to   
facilitate sensible European policymaking?” 
Another question might well be added. Will the 
requisite democratic rules be created in order 
to supervise and to impart legitimacy to this 
sensible kind of European policymaking? 
These questions are being asked in Germany 
and in all of the EU member states, or at least 
in those which have adopted the euro. The 
only thing that can stabilize the euro is a com-
mon economic policy — and today this actually   
intermingles to a large extent with social policy 
as a result of agreements on the pension entry 
age, the number of women gainfully employed, 
and educational standards. A remarkable num-
ber of people critical of the EU agree on this 
point, and they include Barack Obama, the Chi-
nese government, and the rating agencies. Of 
course, this common economic policy cannot 
be achieved with the Treaty of Lisbon. But it is 
the decisive step to a political union, no matter 
whether one continues to call it the European 
Union or the United States of Europe.
And no matter whether there is a referendum or 
whether the decisions are taken by the national 
parliaments, the citizens of the member states 
should cast their votes on the same day. In this 
way everyone will be made aware of the Euro-
Development of European unity
Source: TNS Emnid GmbH / Bertelsmann Stiftung © Bertelsmann Stiftung
What will happen to the EU in the years ahead?
In your opinion, will the process leading to the creation 
of a united Europe . . .?
continue to develop
be reversed
remain on the current level
don’t know, no response
%
34
33
41
27
25
26
35
36
24
4
6
9
Basis:  Germany: 1.001,     France: 1.004,     Poland: 1.000 interviewees
The economist Peter Bofinger, the philosopher 
Julian Nida-Rümelin and Jürgen Habermas 
have put it in a nutshell: “The European nations 
need to understand that they will be able to   
retain their welfare state societal model and the 
cultural diversity of their nation-states only if 
they take joint action. They need to pool their 
resources if they wish to have any kind of influ-
ence on the agenda of global policymaking and 
the resolution of global problems. A rejection of 
European unification would be tantamount to 
bowing out of world history.” (11) 
This means that we have an alternative after 
all. We can be for or against a European answer 
to global problems, and for or against a non-
European and national answer, which would 
be rather fragmentary. To define this alterna-
tive as precisely as possible is a task not only 
for politicians, but for all those in the business 
community and society at large who consider 
a political union to be the right solution. Those 
who reject it should spell out the material and 
non-material cost of their alternative in the 
course of a democratic debate on the subject.
Because all this is not simply about Europe, but 
about democracy in Europe, the electorate is 
going to have the final say in the matter. Politi-
cians should not even fight shy of a referendum. 
It can and it ought to be the constitutive act of 
The EU as a global role model
In your opinion, is the establishment of the European Union by European 
states a model other regions in the world can imitate?
Source: TNS Emnid GmbH / Bertelsmann Stiftung © Bertelsmann Stiftung
clearly a model less clearly a model Don’t know, no response
%
69
56
59
27
39
30
4
5
11
Basis:  Germany: 1.001,     France: 1.004,     Poland: 1.000 interviewees7
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pean significance of the event. Governments 
fought shy of this in the voting on the consti-
tutional treaty in 2005. The consequences are 
well known. Where people actually voted, they 
passed judgment on their own governments. 
This was a success in Spain and Luxembourg, 
but not in France, the Netherlands and Ireland. 
As a result the constitutional treaty was rele-
gated to the back seat. Those who do not wish 
to drive an even larger wedge between Europe 
and democracy should now stand up and tell us 
how to promote integration without consulting 
the electorate, and how to attain a new kind of 
European Union without more democracy. It is 
not a question of whether we should have more 
or less Europe. It is a question of how we might 
be able to create a better Europe. In recent 
months and years it has become apparent that 
this cannot be done on the basis of the existing 
rules. For this reason there is only one answer 
to the crisis. Let us be daring. Let us have more 
democracy. It is what Europe needs. s
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